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Showing posts with label apt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label apt. Show all posts

Friday, 13 February 2015

Giving your network a shot in the arm! Darktrace: The Enterprise Immune System.

I understand that most of you reading this have never worked in a Security Operations Center or SOC for short, but you've all seen them in movies.. 

Sterile, brightly lit rooms of computer screens.  All showing spreadsheets or charts or static maps of the world.  I yawn even thinking of it.
 
And yet the men and women working this environment 24/7 are responsible for detecting that one little anomaly or sorting out the REAL bad traffic patterns from among the thousands of False Positive bad traffic patterns that show up on their screens hourly.

Little wonder the poor Security Analysts over at Target missed the evidence in front of them.  The sheer enormity and chaos of data that assaults them in the course of their workday is stressful and overwhelming.  All the screens look the same, tables and columns, and rows of information about network and security events collected and forwarded by every device on the network.  Then hundred or thousands of rules process them to try to find deviations from "normal traffic".   Like any network has "normal traffic".  Right...

I know.  I've worked in or around these systems for the past two decades.  I've seen the tools appear, mature, merge, morph, and become "fairly" useable.  But the false positives are still rampant, and low and slow "Advanced Persistent Threats" are under the radar and typically don't show up here.

So when an upstart Security Analytics company called me late in 2013 to show me what they've been working on, well... I could care less.  Really... They tried hard to influence me with their Pedigree:  Harking from the minds ex-MI5 Security Intelligence employees, and funded by Autonomy founder Mike Lynch.   But all big software stands on the shoulders of giants, right?

Then a few months ago, a friend of mine convinced me to come out to a public demo of their system. 


Five minutes in, I was awestruck. 

So let me take a second to say that the basis of their tools revolves around some very propeller head complex math that us mere mortals could never comprehend.  They do not rely on rules or signatures or feeds from your network devices.  Yes... they DO require network span or tap at critical aggregation points in your network, but they are able to watch, analyze, identify, and correlate your traffic over a period of time, and through machine learning techniques, develop and understanding of "normal traffic" within several contexts.  

Darktrace touts themselves to be your "Enterprise Immune System", in that like the human body's immune system, which has an understanding of "self" or what belongs or is normal versus contaminants like bacteria or viruses. After a period of mapping your environment's traffic patterns: Source/Destination/Port/Protocol/Time of day/Day of year/etc... Darktrace will use it's learning algorithms to alert on traffic patterns that are NOT normal, and therefore should be looked at. It learns what "normal" or "self" is for each device on your network.  The difference here is the heuristic learning.  Not rules, made be people who think they know the system.  

All very impressive... BUT...  that's not really what caught my eye.  Sorry Darktrace guys, but the person or people you can never let leave your company are the ones who wrote that AWESOMELY FUTURISTIC HUMAN INTERFACE!!!  Oh My God! 
 (pause here to collect my breath)




Remember up top where I said how sterile and drab and monotonous staring at a gazillion screens full of spreadsheets was?   Well... now picture having the tools from Minority Report!  Yeah, you know the ones!   





The screen in front of me started off with a wireframe globe.  Little pins of light would show up, intensify, dim... whatever.. I've seen this before.  But... Our presenter took the mouse, spun the globe a few degrees, and zoomed in "just like in the movies". 

 I got the feeling at first that this was canned video footage. But then the presenter selected one of those intensifying lights. Zoomed in, and as he zoomed, images of network devices started showing up.  Lines between them glowing as well, in various intensities and colors.  They then portrayed a communication session initiated from a desktop to a webserver.  a faint white line... Then immediately more light from that webserver back to another device that turned out to be an associated database server... AND more illuminated lines back to the network storage array...  That one transaction, a web page request I would imagine, allowed me to visualize *VISUALIZE* connectivity to the various sub components of the web applications infrastructure.  

Before anyone had a chance to ask about those red glowing devices and lines, the presenter clicked one and detailed how THIS was not typical traffic from that particular device at this time of day, nor from the area of the network being connected.   Anomalous behaviorVISIBLE in real time.  

On a 3D rotatable glowing thingamabobber of a Awesome Graphical User Interface.  

If you want your Security Operations Center personnel to be engaged, alert, 
and notice the anomalies... 
let them play with Darktrace just for a few days.  I guarantee you'll  leave it in. 






Darktrace Corporate Overview.

References:
www.darktrace.com 
Darktrace: Enterprise Immune System 
Darktrace: Recursive Bayesian Estimation 
Darktrace CEO Joins Prime Minister David Cameron on Official Cyber Security Visit to Washington D.C.  
Former MI5 chief advises Darktrace 
GCHQ Defence chief to head cyber security start-up Darktrace  

ZDNet: Darktrace: What happens when Bayesian analysis is turned on intruders 

Deloitte: The ‘Immune System’ of Enterprise IT?
How Threats Disguise Their Network Traffic 
TrendMicro: Network Detection Evasion Methods
What is “Normal Traffic” Anyway? (by Chris Greer) 
MI5: UK Security Intelligence

Cyber Security Exchange Conference with Darktrace 

Saturday, 8 November 2014

Risk reduction through Jump Servers



A common practice in today's data centers is to allow Systems Administrators Remote Desktop  (RDP) or Secure Shell (SSH) access to the servers they are administrating, directly from their desktops.  Regardless of where they are located!

Although restricting Lateral access between servers is quite easily achieved through group policy on Windows, or source whitelisting local firewall rules for both Windows and UNIX/Linux, these are not enabled by default. Typically, even with network segmentation and access control lists, is is possible to jump from server to server unhindered, by simply having access to the appropriate credentials. 



Both the Target Breach, and the Home Depot Breach were initiated by a compromised business partner with access to internal resources.  Those accounts were used to assess the network topology and browse the corporate directories to find more privileged accounts. Once inside, these credentials could be used to log onto servers within the environment in search of information or more credentials to abuse. The attacker could, over time, hop from server to server essentially unnoticed.




Restricting Lateral Access within your Network
The concept of a "jump" server has been around for decades, but is rarely in use or enforced.  One popular use of jump servers is to restrict access into a DMZ. This allows administrative control of servers in the DMZ to be regulated and audited as per compliance rules.


In Microsoft Technet's  "Implementing Secure Administrative Hosts", they state: 
Secure administrative hosts are workstations or servers that have been configured specifically for the purposes of creating secure platforms from which privileged accounts can perform administrative tasks in Active Directory or on domain controllers, domain-joined systems, and applications running on domain-joined systems. In this case, “privileged accounts” refers not only to accounts that are members of the most privileged groups in Active Directory, but to any accounts that have been delegated rights and permissions that allow administrative tasks to be performed.
.......

Although the “most privileged” accounts and groups should accordingly be the most stringently protected, this does not eliminate the need to protect any accounts and groups to which privileges above those of standard user accounts have been granted.

A secure administrative host can be a dedicated workstation that is used only for administrative tasks, a member server that runs the Remote Desktop Gateway server role and to which IT users connect to perform administration of destination hosts, or a server that runs the Hyper-V® role and provides a unique virtual machine for each IT user to use for their administrative tasks. In many environments, combinations of all three approaches may be implemented.

So... restrict access to servers, specifically for anyone with privileges above a basic user. 
I can't argue with that at all... 


Enter CyberArk's Next Generation Jump Server

More than just a jump server from which to initiate RDP or SSH sessions, CyberArk has added Privileged Session Management to monitor and record all access through the jump server. The tightly integrated SSH proxy is context aware, and can be configured to look for anomalous behavior.  Not only can you control "who" has access to "what" through the jump server, but you can alert on suspicious or anomalous activity within those sessions.  Both secure RDP to Windows servers, as well as SSH to UNIX/Linux/Network appliances are managed via Privileged Session Manager on the jump server.  

The jump server can now be used to isolate your server environment from  your workstation endpoints, and provide real-time visibility into administrative access.  Without adding agents to the servers being administered, you can use workflows to augment authentication and authorization, and monitor access at a granular level, recording all activities for future playback and potential audit attestation.

Integrate this service with their Enterprise Password Vault, and you have significantly reduced privilege escalation from your threat landscape.



Rogue or Malicious Administrator
Many companies, small and large alike, allow almost unrestricted access to the data center servers for administrator, both from within the local network, and over VPN. The excuse being that this is required in case of a emergency.

This excessive access allows anyone authenticated, malicious or otherwise, to jump laterally from server to server.  The Target Breach, in particular is known to have accommodated it's attackers by allowing a credentialed account in the Business Partner network to access servers in the core data center, and ultimately get on to the Point-of-Sale systems.  Restricting this lateral access by enforcing the use of jump servers would not totally remove the Rogue Administrator threat, however all access through the server would be monitored and recorded.  Any administrative commands/requests/activities that were deemed anomalous by predefined security policies could be blocked and/or alerted on.


Malware Mitigation
By allowing lateral access between servers, an infected server could act to propagate malicious code to its peers. Most Advanced Persistent Threats rely on the ability to see peer servers laterally and scan them for exploitable opportunities.  With jump servers in place, and lateral access removed through policy, malicious actors and malware alike will not be able to propagate without going through the jump server and being seen/alerted/blocked.


Pass the Hash
One of the techniques typical of a APT is the “Pass the Hash” attack, where the invader captures account logon credentials in the form of a cached password "hash" on one machine and then use them to authenticate to another machine.  This little known exposure has been around for a couple decades, but has become an industry favorite among cyber criminals.  By enforcing all server remote administration through the jump servers, this method of subversion is eliminated.

Don't be the next headline.  Choosing either CyberArk's suite of Privileged Access and Session Management tools or another Remote Access Gateway product will significantly reduce your threat landscape and allow you to sleep more easily.


References:

CyberArk: Are You Ready to Take the Next Jump? Secure your IT Environment with Next Gen Jump Servers
Privileged Accounts at Root of Most Data Breaches
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pass_the_hash
SANS: Pass-the-hash attacks: Tools and Mitigation
Microsoft: Defending Against Pass-the-Hash Attacks
CyberArk Launches Enhanced “CyberArk DNA” to Detect Pass-the-Hash Vulnerabilities
NSA: Reducing the Effectiveness of Pass-the-Hash 
The World's #1 Cyber Security Risk - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
IT World Canada: Early lessons from the Target breach
IT World Canada: Hacking of HVAC supplier led to Target breach: Report
IT World: Home Depot says attackers stole a vendor's credentials to break in
Cisco: Putting a Damper on ‘Lateral Movement’ due to Cyber-Intrusion  
Trend Micro: How Do Threat Actors Move Deeper Into Your Network? 
Prevent Lateral Movement With Local Accounts (Windows) 
Lateral Movement: No Patch for Privilege Escalation 
Intel: Achieving PCI DSS compliance when managing retail devices with Intel® vPro™ technology 
Techrepublic: Jump boxes vs. firewalls 
Microsoft: Implementing Secure Administrative Hosts 
CyberArk: Privileged Session Manager 
ITWorld Canada: The 10 Step Action Plan - Building Your Custom Defense Against Targeted Attacks and Advanced Persistent Threats

Wednesday, 23 July 2014

Denial of Service? What is it, and how can we defend against it? - Executive Overview

I've been asked to write a higher level version of some of my blogs.  Apparently my writing is too technical... 


According to Prolexic (now part of Akamai), DDoS, or Distributed Denial of Service attacks are on the rise, and getting smarter. 

If you rely on an internet facing website or service to either bring in, or communicate with customers, there's a good chance that service will be disrupted or greatly impacted in the near future.

A Distributed Denial of Service attack is a method used by an individual or group that wishes to do harm against your company by essentially making your website inaccessible. New attack tools are readily available on the black market, and reports indicate that attack traffic is up 133% over this time last year.

By sending large quantities of traffic requests to your company website (tens of thousands of hits per second), the attackers basically overload the website's ability to respond and service legitimate customer requests.  If your website is down, you are not reaching customers, and not generating revenue.    Even a mild attack has the effect of slowing down your website to the point where customers may not want to use it. Corporate reputation may be at risk as a cause of such attack.

The primary way that businesses can and are protecting themselves against these DDoS attacks is through the use of Content Deliver Networks.  

(for a more technical overview, please see my blog on CDN: Content Delivery Networks in the Context of Security).

A Content Delivery Network, such as Akamai/Prolexic augments your corporate website service by mirroring your website through many webservers distributed globally on their own network.  Should a Distributed Denial of Service attack be launched against your website, the effect of that attack is spread across many, many servers. The result is a greatly reduced impact on the service provided to you customers. In most cases, the net slowdown is almost immeasurable.



 Introducing a CDN service to front your Critical Corporate websites not only makes sense, but will greatly enhance your Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity programme.



 Should you find your website under attack right now, please look into the following service from Akamai.

Emergency DDoS Protection Service to Stop a Cyber Attack



References:

Friday, 4 July 2014

Advanced Persistent Threats, the Killchain, and FireEye...


Over the past several years, our Defence In Depth strategy has been working overtime to keep up with Advanced Persistent Threats and Zero Day Exploits. Firewalls, Intrusion Prevention, URL filtering, and AntiVirus are no longer sufficient to stave off a data breach.

Ask any Military Tactician, and they will tell you that the Defence in Depth strategy is intended to merely slow down an attacker, to buy time, and potentially exhaust the attackers resources.  In and of itself, this strategy, given time, will fall.


According to a report by analyst firm Gartner, adding more layers of defense will not necessarily improve protection from targeted threats. What is needed, the analysts say, is the evolution of better security controls.

A new way of thinking needs to be employed... A counter methodology needs to be embedded in the corporate security culture, and tooling needs to be put in place to proactively remediate against today's type of attacks.

RSA: The Malware Factory and Massive Morphing Malware



We've been hearing more and more about Advanced Persistent Threats or Advanced Volatile Threats or just Advanced Threats.. where a Threat Actor  (person/agency/government) is intent on getting access to your confidential or sensitive data, and has the time and resources to invest in a calculated exercise to achieve this goal. Malicious tools have evolved to the point where you can automate the build of thousands of variants to piece of malware, and deliver each one to a specific person or machine.  No Signature based AntiVirus on the planet would catch a one-off piece of malicious code.  

Enter FireEye® with it's  Advanced Malware Protection appliances.  Established in 2004 as a security research company, they came up with the novel concept of using Virtualization to launch and assess the activity of "payloads" such as email attachments or downloaded files.  Any attachment, executable, zip file etc.. is run within a series of sanitized virtual environments, and any unexpected activity would be flagged for analysis. One of the malicious activities identified early on was the "callback" to botnet Command and Control servers.  

As a valuable byproduct of the development of this system, FireEye amassed a large database of "known" Threat Actors.  This intelligence is then used to block any subsequent activities to those Threat Actors across FireEye's entire customer base.


When installed inline at the Internet landing zone, FireEye (Both Mail and Web) adds a proactive member to your existing reactive firewall, IPS, and URL filters.

“Advanced threats against enterprises today thrive on exploiting the unknown and evading blocking techniques thanks to a growing, global marketplace for selling software vulnerabilities,” said Zheng Bu, vice president of security research, FireEye. “The old security model of tracking known threats and relying on signature-based solutions are simply powerless to stop zero-day threats. The number of zero-day attacks profiled in the paper highlight why organizations need to take a new approach to security by combining next-generation technology with human expertise.”



So we have a proactive tool to identify anomalous behaviour, and identify/prevent Zero-day attacks... Now what?



A methodology first described by Lockheed Martin, the Cyber "Kill Chain" can be used to identify, and proactively mitigate and remediate against these advanced security threats.




From the Lockheed Martin paper:
(I added the Red Text to show the result of implementing FireEye)
  1. Reconnaissance - Research, identification and selection of targets, often represented as crawling Internet websites such as conference proceedings and mailing lists for email addresses, social relationships, or information on specific technologies. 
  • If the reconnaissance is done as a form of phishing exercise, there will likely be links in the email back to a C&C server on the Internet.  Any attempt to connect to that network (ie: clicking the link) would be blocked by FireEye and generate an alert to the SIEM.
  1. Weaponization - Coupling a remote access trojan with an exploit into a deliverable payload, typically by means of an automated tool (weaponizer). Increasingly, client application data files such as Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents serve as the weaponized deliverable. 
  • Email attachments as well as files downloaded from the Internet will be assessed by FireEye (Executed in several virtual sandboxes), and if deemed malicious, will alert the SIEM, block callbacks, and prevent further downloads.
  1. Delivery - Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment. The three most prevalent delivery vectors for weaponized payloads by APT actors, as observed by the Lockheed Martin Computer Incident Response Team (LM-CIRT) for the years 2004-2010, are email attachments, websites, and USB removable media. 
  •  As in Weaponization, Email attachments as well as files downloaded from the Internet will be assessed by FireEye (Executed in several virtual sandboxes), and if deemed malicious, will alert the SIEM, block callbacks, and prevent further downloads.
  1. Exploitation - After the weapon is delivered to victim host, exploitation triggers intruders’ code. Most often, exploitation targets an application or operating system vulnerability, but it could also more simply exploit the users themselves or leverage an operating system feature that auto-executes code.Installation - Installation of a remote access trojan or backdoor on the victim system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the environment. 
  • *IF* a malicious application DOES get installed out of band, ie: from CD or USB drive, any callbacks would be blocked by FireEye, raising an alert in SIEM, and preventing subsequent communication with the C&C and subsequent downloads.
  • Host Protection tools on your servers are HIGHLY recommended to prevent installation and  execution of any such malicious applications in the first place.
  1. Installation - Installation of a remote access trojan or backdoor on the victim system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the environment.
  • Host Protection tools on your servers are HIGHLY recommended to prevent installation and execution of any such malicious applications in the first place.
  1. Command and Control (C2) - Typically, compromised hosts must beacon outbound to an Internet controller server to establish a C2 channel. APT malware especially requires manual interaction rather than conduct activity automatically. Once the C2 channel establishes, intruders have “hands on the keyboard” access inside the target environment.
  • FireEye will block callbacks to the Command and Control, and prevent further downloads. 
  1. Actions on Objectives - Only now, after progressing through the first six phases, can intruders take actions to achieve their original objectives. Typically, this objective is data exfiltration which involves collecting, encrypting and extracting information from the victim environment; violations of data integrity or availability are potential objectives as well. Alternatively, the intruders may only desire access to the initial victim box for use as a hop point to compromise additional systems and move laterally inside the network.
  •  Malicious code will not be able to exfiltrate data, if callbacks are blocked, and the Command and Control IP addresses are blocked.  Again, any attempt to do so, would send alerts to the SIEM while still being blocked.








I am not suggesting that FireEye in and of itself is a full Malware mitigation strategy.  I HIGHLY recommend that you also install Host Protection tools on your servers, and run  network firewall, Intrusion Prevention, layer two segregation, and Email/URL filtering as well. 

With FireEye installed in your internet egress, inspecting both Mail and Web content, you significantly reduce the risk of malware infection and subsequent Data Breach by phishing emails or drive by downloads.



References:


Dell Secureworks: Managed FireEye - Advanced Malware Protection Service
Gartner: Best-Practices-for-Mitigating-Advanced-Persistent-Threats CISCO: Advanced Malware Protection
DarkReading: FireEye Releases Comprehensive Analysis of 2013 Zero-day Attacks; Impact on Security Models 
RSA: The Malware Factory and Massive Morphing Malware 
http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeid=apt-infographic-1
Email Security (FireEye EX Series)
FireEye: Cybersecurity's Maginot Line A real World Assessment
FireEye: Advanced Threat Report 2013
FireEye: Multi-Vector Virtual Execution (MVX) engine 
http://newsroNSS Labs Ranks Cisco Advanced Malware Protection Among Top Breach Detection Systemsom.cisco.com/press-release-content?articleId=1403242
Paloalto: Advanced Persistent Threats
OWASP: Defense_in_depth
NSA: Defence in Depth
Government of Canada: Mitigation Guidelines for Advanced Persistent Threats
Lockheed Martin: Kill Chain Analysis
RSA: Adversary ROI: Evaluating Security from the Threat Actor’s Perspective
 http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2014/06/turing-test-in-reverse-new-sandbox-evasion-techniques-seek-human-interaction.html
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134037/strategic-planning-erm/the-practicality-of-the-cyber-kill-chain-approach-to-security.html
Digital Bread Crumbs: Seven Clues To Identifying Who’s Behind Advanced Cyber Attacks
Microsoft: The evolution of malware and the threat landscape. – a 10-year review 
Kaspersky: MALWARE EVOLUTION. THE TOP SECURITY STORIES OF 2013 
McAfee Identified an Astounding 200 New Malware Samples Per Minute in 2013 
Paloalto: The Modern Malware Review